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ABSTRACT: What is it for an analytic philosopher to do ideology critique? Just how useful are the proprietary tools of 
analytic philosophy when it comes to thinking about ideology, and in what sense ‘useful’, and to whom? And 
to what end might analytic philosophers pursue ideology critique? Here I attempt to say something about these 
questions by commenting on a recent contribution to analytic ideology critique, Jason Stanley’s How Propa-
ganda Works.
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RESUMEN: ¿Qué significa para un filósofo analítico hacer crítica de la ideología? ¿En qué medida son útiles las herra-
mientas propias de la filosofía analítica cuando se trata de pensar sobre la ideología, y en qué sentido de ‘útiles’, 
y para quién? Y ¿con qué fin podrían emprender los filósofos analíticos la crítica de la ideología? Aquí pretendo 
decir algo acerca de estas cuestiones comentando una reciente contribución a la crítica analítica de la idelogía, la 
obra de Jason Stanley How Propaganda Works.
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1
It is now twelve years since Charles Mills published “Ideal Theory as Ideology”, his power-
ful condemnation of mainstream political philosophy (Mills 2004). In that paper Mills ac-
cuses analytic political philosophers of neglecting our non-ideal political realities —espe-
cially the workings of race, gender and class-based ideology— and moreover doing so for 
ideological reasons. Such neglect, Mills suggests, is not simply a matter of disciplinary em-
phasis or style, but a means of entrenching the political status quo. By asking what politi-
cal arrangement would be best, without asking how and why our current arrangements fall 
so short of that ideal, political philosophers (overwhelmingly white, middle class men) en-
sure that we are deprived of the tools to secure justice, all the while presenting themselves 
as squarely concerned with justice. Many analytic feminist philosophers, most notably Sally 
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Haslanger, have spent the last few decades issuing a similar critique, and trying to bend the 
energies of analytic philosophy towards non-ideal concerns. For Haslanger this is a matter 
of turning the tools of analytic metaphysics towards the construction of social reality, both 
in the familiar descriptive sense of grappling with the ontological mechanisms that produce 
the social world, but also in the less familiar prescriptive sense of using metaphysics to recon-
struct the non-ideal into something better – something more ethical and more just. Thus 
Mills, in his comments on Haslanger’s Resisting Reality (2012), writes that: “Haslanger is 
carrying out a task that should in principle be completely recognizable to her predecessors: 
Ideologiekritik” (Mills 2014).
The work of both Mills and Haslanger are object lessons in the value of analytic meth-
ods for thinking about questions that have been the main province of critical theorists and 
Continental philosophers. (Later in his comments on Haslanger’s book, Mills writes: “If 
this book needs to be given as a…present for those (the majority) in mainstream M&E du-
bious that race and gender have any relevance for their research, it also needs to be given as 
a…present for those (the majority) in mainstream critical and race and gender theory du-
bious that analytic M&E has any relevance for their research” (Mills 2014).) Their work 
also provides object lessons in the importance of calling oneself back, as politically engaged 
theorists, to the material realities of those one hopes to serve. But as the topic of ideology 
comes in from the margins into the analytic mainstream, many questions remain. Just how 
much can and should analytic philosophers engage with the great critics of ideology out-
side the analytic tradition – Marx, Althusser, Lukács, Gramsci, Adorno and Horkheimer; 
Beauvoir, MacKinnon, Butler, hooks and Lorde; Fanon, Du Bois, Saïd and Baldwin? What 
can be learned from them, and what (if anything) do they leave for us to say? Just how use-
ful are our proprietary tools as analytic philosophers for thinking about ideology, and in 
what sense ‘useful’, and to whom? How much we can assimilate ideology to phenomena 
with which we as analytic philosophers are well acquainted, namely the phenomena stud-
ied by epistemology and the philosophy of mind? Is ideology to be thought of in the famil-
iar terms of belief, evidence, and bias, or does the existence of ideology reveal the limits of 
these ways of conceptualising the mind and its workings? And finally there is the question 
of ends. Ideology critique —as opposed to the merely descriptive study of ideology— seeks 
at once to describe and change the world. To what extent is such an ambition compatible 
with the homelier, truth-seeking ambitions of traditional analytic philosophy? And to what 
extent must analytic philosophy itself change through its confrontation with ideology?
Here I attempt to say something about these questions. I do so by commenting spe-
cifically on a recent contribution to analytic ideology critique, Jason Stanley’s How Propa-
ganda Works (2015). Despite the focus of my comments, I hope that what I have to say ap-
plies more broadly to the general question of how analytic philosophers can and should talk 
about ideology, and to what end.
2
As its title suggests, Stanley’s book offers an account of how propaganda works – in partic-
ular, how propaganda works in a putatively liberal, democratic society such as exists in the 
United States. But alongside his account of propaganda, Stanley aims to provide a novel 
(and importantly non-moral) argument for the badness of material inequality, and moreo-
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ver to make the case that the tools of analytic philosophy —most notably the tools of phi-
losophy of language and epistemology— are vital for thinking carefully about ideology, 
power, injustice, and oppression. These two more implicit projects are, I take it, as impor-
tant to Stanley as the explicit project of explaining exactly how propaganda works. In any 
case these two projects are the focus of my comments here.
To anticipate: after I raise an objection to Stanley’s non-moral argument for the bad-
ness of material inequality, I will press what I take to be a deeper worry – that Stanley’s 
non-moral argument against inequality reveals his desire to produce an internal critique of 
American democracy, a critique that will be rationally compelling to the privileged elite. 
But why, I want to ask, should we care about winning over the hearts and minds of the 
elite? Why shouldn’t our goal rather be an external critique, or rather, an external revolu-
tion, of the kind, at least on a traditional Marxian view, that the oppressed are uniquely po-
sitioned to perform? And, once we abandon the project of trying to win over the hearts and 
minds of the elite, how confident should we really be that what we need most urgently is 
careful analytic philosophy, rather than revolutionary politics?
3
In brief, Stanley’s argument for the incompatibility of substantial material inequality and 
democracy goes like this: (1) substantial material inequality, whether unjust or just, pre-
dictably leads to the emergence of bad ideology,2 (2) the existence of bad ideology makes 
us susceptible to demagoguery, a pernicious form of propaganda, (3) demagoguery under-
mines democracy by creating epistemological inequalities. Thus substantial material in-
equality, whether just or unjust, undermines democracy. If successful, Stanley’s argument 
gives us a non-moral reason to dislike substantial material inequality, at least insofar as we 
are independently committed to a democratic society.
There are questions to be asked about each stage of Stanley’s argument. For example, 
how does Stanley’s explanation of propaganda in terms of the distinction between at-is-
sue content and not-at-issue content sit with his claim that it is bad ideology that makes 
us susceptible to demagoguery? Here we have seemingly two different explanations of 
how propaganda works – even two different notions of what it is for propaganda to 
‘work’: one that appeals to an intrinsic pragmatic feature of natural language (the at-is-
sue/not-at-issue distinction), and another that presupposes the existence of a contingent 
social and political structure (bad ideology). The first explanation roughly cashes out 
in terms of individualistic psychology, mediated through language, while the latter is a 
structural explanation that accounts for individual behaviour in terms of a broader (and 
non-necessary) social reality. One might wonder whether these explanations are mutu-
ally sustaining, and if so how – or whether Stanley’s inclusion of the first is an instance 
where typically philosophical preoccupations come up against the actual phenomenon of 
ideology. But what I’d like to focus on for the moment is the first move of the argument, 
namely Stanley’s claim that the existence of substantial material inequality, whether just 
or unjust, leads to bad ideology.
2 Stanley used the term ‘flawed’ ideology, but I prefer the more traditional ‘bad’.
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Imagine for a moment that we live in a Nozickian society – by which I mean a society 
in which there is substantial but just material inequality. A minority of people have the ma-
jority of the resources, but these resources are distributed through a series of just transfers; 
no one has anything they are not entitled to, and everyone has everything to which they are 
entitled. Of course if you think that Nozick is simply wrong about the demands of justice, 
then you will deny that such a Nozickian world is possible – for if Nozick is wrong, he is 
(presumably) necessarily wrong. But such a world, even if metaphysically impossible, is pre-
sumably conceivable – certainly many Americans think it is not only possible but actual. 
So let us imagine we live in such a society. My question is this: would elites in a Nozickian 
world develop bad ideology?
It’s hard for me to see why we should think they would. They would correctly believe, af-
ter all, that they were entitled to a disproportionate share of society’s resources. Stanley might 
be right that the elites in such a society would be strongly attached to this true story, that it 
would be part of what made them feel content with the status quo, but that’s not the same as 
saying that such elites would be attached to a legitimation myth about themselves. Now, on 
Stanley’s notion of ideological belief, any belief that is resistant to counter-evidence —any be-
lief that lies near the centre of one’s doxastic web— counts as ideology. But that rules in too 
many items of knowledge as ideology: my belief that I have hands, that 2 + 2 = 4, that my 
mother loves me, all count as ideology on Stanley’s schema.3 To avoid the implication that 
much mundane knowledge is politically harmful, Stanley argues that it is only bad ideology 
that makes us susceptible to propaganda and undermines democracy. So the question is: is the 
true belief of the Nozickian elites that they are entitled to their resources an item of bad ideol-
ogy? What could make it bad? Perhaps we might say: if an unjust inequality arises in our No-
zickian society, the elites will likely not realise it, since they are attached to the view that the 
current distribution of resources is just. But then we are back where we started: elites are bad 
at recognising unjust inequalities, and this undermines democracy. But what we were after is 
an argument that shows us that even just inequalities undermine democracy.
In other words, I’m worried that Stanley’s non-moral argument against inequality 
doesn’t work. If there is substantial unjust inequality —and I take it there’s plenty— then 
it’s plausible to think this will predictably lead to bad ideology, in turn undermining the 
epistemological preconditions of democracy. That argument might very well still stand. 
But I don’t quite see how Stanley can make the stronger argument that even just substantial 
inequality —were it possible— undermines democracy. For if inequality is not unjust, it is 
not clear why elites require a legitimation myth to sustain it, rather than just a clear-eyed 
appreciation of how things really are.
4
I want now to say something more general about Stanley’s ambition to provide a non-moral 
argument against inequality. Novel arguments against inequality are of course politically 
most welcome, and there is a pragmatic benefit in finding arguments that do not target the 
3 I don’t mean to suggest that no items of knowledge are good candidates for ideological belief – some 
self-fulfilling true beliefs might be paradigm cases of ideological belief.
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intrinsic moral badness of inequality. In the US for example, the argument that inequal-
ity undermines economic growth will certainly be more compelling to some ears than the 
claim that inequality is in itself unjust, or predictably leads to injustice. So I am sympa-
thetic to the thought that there is something politically worthwhile in making the case that 
inequality undermines democracy through a purely epistemic mechanism.
But how far will such an argumentative strategy take us, and what it is its place in poli-
tics more generally? It seems to me that Stanley’s motivation for offering such an argument 
is that he wants to be able to offer an internal critique of American society – that is, he 
wants to show those who are putatively committed to democracy, but sanguine about mas-
sive inequality, that they are on unstable ground. Stanley wants to expose the internal con-
tradictions within putatively democratic but highly unequal societies. It is for this reason, I 
suspect, that Stanley wants to articulate an argument against inequality that doesn’t rest on 
any substantive moral premise.
But I wonder, and this is a genuine question about politics —what it is and how to 
do it well— whether what we really need is such an internal critique. I wonder, in other 
words, whether Stanley’s project isn’t constrained by its implicit desire to appeal to elites. 
If Stanley’s argument against inequality does turn out to assume that substantive inequality 
is unjust —if it turns out to rest on moral premises after all— is that such a bad thing? The 
argument won’t get a grip on many elites, yes, but is that the litmus test of our political the-
orising, of our ideology critique? I will return to this general question shortly: that is, the 
question of whether Stanley’s project is too closely focussed on the possibilities of the elite 
position, and too little focussed on the political possibility to be found in the position of 
the oppressed. To get there I want first to turn to what Stanley has to say specifically about 
the epistemological situation of both the elite and the oppressed.
5
To explain why the elite develop and sustain bad ideology, Stanley draws on the resources 
of social psychology – the elite, he says, exhibit the kind of motivated reasoning known as 
‘identity protective legitimation’. Again I’m curious about Stanley’s motivation here. Why 
do we need such a psychological account – that is, the sort of account that is useful for ex-
plaining the maintenance of belief in the face of overwhelming counterevidence? The pre-
supposition seems to be that elites are constantly having to do battle with counter-evidence 
to their bad ideology; that the world as it presents itself to elites consistently threatens their 
self-conception; that there is something not only deeply but superficially precarious about 
the elite worldview.
I make the distinction between superficial and deep precarity of the elite worldview be-
cause I share with Stanley (and Marx and Beauvoir) the view that most oppressive ideol-
ogy, whether anti-democratic or capitalist or patriarchal, masks deep contradictions, not 
least because capitalism itself, as Nancy Fraser reminds us, requires the anti-capitalist space 
of the patriarchal home to function (Fraser 2014). But for thinkers like Marx and Beau-
voir, these contradictions do not make capitalist or patriarchal ideology superficially vulner-
able. Capitalist ideology —the view that everything, labour included, is to be understood 
in terms of exchange value rather than use value— is not subject to an onslaught of coun-
terevidence. For this ideology is shaped by and shapes the material world, such that, from 
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the perspective of the bourgeoisie, everything just is exchange value. Thus Marx writes in 
C apital that from the bourgeois perspective, the sphere of capitalist exchange is “in fact a 
very Eden of the innate rights of man,” where “alone rule Freedom, Equality, Property” 
(2004, 492). He goes on:
Freedom, because both buyer and seller of a commodity, say of labour power, are constrained 
only by their own free will. They contract as free agents, and the agreement they come to is but the 
form in which they give legal expression to their common will. Equality, because each enters into 
relation with the other, as with a simple owner of commodities, and they exchange equivalent for 
equivalent. Property, because each disposes only of what is his own… Each looks to himself only, 
and no one troubles himself about the rest, and just because they do so, do they all, in accordance 
with the pre-established harmony of things, or under the auspices of an all-shrewd providence, 
work together to their mutual advantage, for the common weal and in the interest of all (ibid 492)
Similarly, while Beauvoir (1953) thinks there is a deep contradiction at the heart of patri-
archy —namely, that men posit themselves as radically free subjects but are dependent on 
women-as-objects to achieve that subject-position— she does not think that men are con-
stantly confronted by this contradiction. From the male perspective, women are objects, 
and not only because they see them as objects, but because women have been made into 
objects. In other words: once we confront the full force and power of oppressive ideology 
—its embeddedness in material and practical reality— do we really need to explain its sus-
tenance in terms of individualistic psychology? No doubt psychological phenomena like 
confirmation bias, wishful thinking and motivated reasoning have some explanatory role 
to play. But isn’t the simpler, more structural explanation of why elites hold onto their elite 
ideology simply that their experience of the world, rather than resist their cherished self-
conception, everywhere confirms it?
This is not to deny that there is something contradictory or perverse in the ruling 
group’s worldview. Theirs is a limited perspective, one that does not get them onto the way 
things really are. But there is also a sense, for Marx and his followers at least, that the world 
of the ruling group is all too real – the material reality of capitalist exchange, for example, 
constantly re-enforces the capitalist outlook that everything is fundamentally a matter of 
exchange rather than of use-value. Analogously, it is not that men must constantly do dox-
astic battle with the overwhelming evidence that women are their equals; rather, the mate-
rial reality of the sex situation constantly speaks to and confirms male superiority. Similar 
things, of course, could be said about the ideology of racial superiority.
6
If for Marx and his followers like Althusser and Lukács the ideological position of the op-
pressor is not merely a matter of bad ideology —that is, bad ideas— but also a matter of 
matter, of material, then how is emancipation from bad ideology even possible? Marx’s an-
swer, famously, was that we shouldn’t look to the capitalist oppressors for emancipation. 
Rather, it is the proletariat who are uniquely positioned, epistemically speaking, to recog-
nise the contradictions within capitalism. And for a Marxist feminist like Hartsock, it is 
women who are uniquely positioned, epistemically speaking, to recognise the deep contra-
dictions of patriarchy (Hartsock 1983). In each case —that is, in the case of the proletariat 
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and in the case of women— it is their special relationship to material reality that affords 
them this ‘double vision’. The proletariat sells its labour to produce objects essential to hu-
man life, and so is able to see through the bourgeois illusions that labour is just another 
commodity and that all value is exchange value. By analogy, women have a special material 
relationship to the means of reproduction —through their traditional role in childcare and 
the domestic sphere— and so are uniquely situated to see through patriarchal ideology to 
the genuine conditions of human flourishing.4 Thus the proletariat and women see doubly: 
first, the world as given within oppressive ideology, and second, the world as it really is.
Stanley reserves the last two chapters of his book to explore the ideology of the op-
pressed as opposed to the oppressors, with particular attention to the question of false 
consciousness. He wants to address Michael Rosen’s challenge to offer a mechanism 
whereby the oppressed continue to believe a false ideology that goes against their interests 
(Rosen 1996). But Stanley tells us far less about what he thinks about the Marxian view 
that the oppressed, while no doubt suffering from false consciousness, are also uniquely 
positioned to detect the contradictions within the status quo. This classic Marxian view 
stands in tension with Stanley’s claim that those who command fewest resources are most 
epistemically oppressed, that is, least in a position to know things that are vital for politi-
cal emancipation. Elsewhere Stanley has argued for an interest-relative view of knowledge, 
according to which whether one knows some proposition turns on what’s at stake, practi-
cally speaking, in the context at hand (Stanley 2005). In short, the more it matters to you 
whether you’re getting on to the truth, the harder it is to know the truth. If there’s rela-
tively little downside to your getting the answer wrong, then it’s relatively easy to know 
the answer. In How Propaganda Works Stanley doesn’t argue for interest-relativity. He 
thinks it’s enough to assume (as most epistemologists do) that something bad typically 
happens, epistemically speaking, when one is in a high stakes situation. Perhaps, he says, 
one doesn’t lose justification when the stakes raise, but even so one might —as a purely 
psychological matter— lose confidence, thereby stripping away one’s knowledge. Or one 
might retain one’s knowledge, but still be thought not to know by others, precisely be-
cause it’s so important to one that one is right.
I want to suggest that Stanley is mistaken here: that it really does matter whether 
knowledge is sensitive to stakes or not in the kind of cases we’re discussing. We might all 
admit that as a psychological matter people are wont to lose confidence (and thus knowl-
edge) in high-stakes situations, or that people are wont to be treated by others as not know-
ing in high-stakes situation. And yet, it matters crucially, I want to suggest, whether the op-
pressed can retain their knowledge even when the stakes go up. Suppose a woman knows 
she has been sexually harassed by her boss. She is encouraged by a friend to take legal action. 
Suddenly the stakes are up. It really matters to this woman that she’s right: not just for the 
legal outcome,5 but for her sense of self, her sense of the righteousness of her protest. Ac-
cording to the interest-relative account that Stanley supports, this woman no longer knows 
that she has been sexually harassed once the stakes are sufficiently high. By contrast, ac-
4 As Hartsock herself notes, her explanation for women’s privileged standpoint presupposes a fairly uni-
fied notion of female experience, a notion that does not sit particularly well with the intersectional 
turn within feminism.
5 Indeed it’s not entirely clear how closely tied legal outcomes are to being in the right.
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cording to the sort of hard-nosed epistemic externalism I’m inclined to favour,6 so long as 
the woman is reliably tracking the situation —so long as she really is sensitive to the sex-
ual harassment that she experienced— then, assuming she doesn’t lose her nerve, she con-
tinues to know that she has been sexually harassed, no matter how much scepticism or gas-
lighting she encounters. This seems to be to be the right thing to say, both in terms of my 
intuitive judgment about the case, but also in terms of what sort of epistemology we want 
for politics. It seems right to me, both theoretically and politically, to say that this woman 
continues to know that she has been sexually harassed, and that indeed she continues to act 
rationally when she pursues her protest.7 In other words, it seems right to me, both theoret-
ically and politically, to say that oppressed people can have substantial epistemological ad-
vantages over their oppressors.8
This takes us to what I see as a serious question in political epistemology: how to strike 
the right balance between getting on to the genuine epistemic injustices that are wrought 
by oppression —of the kind that Miranda Fricker (2007) has most notably written 
about— and vindicating the thought that the oppressed are, in virtue of their oppression, 
positioned to see what others do not. Though both these impulses must be respected in an 
adequate political epistemology, my own instinct is to go far more Marxian than Stanley 
does.9 Perhaps this is because of our different views of elite ideology. While Stanley seems 
to think that elites are constantly battling counterevidence to their ideological worldviews, 
and thus are at least theoretically capable of ideological reform, I’m tempted to be far less 
optimistic. On the other hand, I’m far more optimistic than Stanley about the epistemo-
logical resources available to the oppressed. Stanley sees the oppressed as epistemological 
victims, and the elite as epistemological miscreants who might still be reformed – whereas 
6 Roughly I favour a view according to which epistemic justification is simply a matter of whether one’s 
belief is a product of a reliable or safe mechanism. According to this sort of view, justification cannot 
be defeated by higher-order misleading evidence.
7 While I am inclined towards this judgment —namely, that knowledge in such a case is sufficient for ra-
tional action— there is a substantial and difficult question here. One might think for example that the 
woman in our case could very well continue to know (despite the high stakes) that she has been sexu-
ally harassed, but nonetheless that these high stakes deprive her of the capacity to rationally deliberate 
on this knowledge. Thanks to Mikkel Gerken for discussion of this issue.
8 When I say that it’s both theoretically and politically right to say this, I mean first that my straightfor-
ward epistemological intuition in the sexual harassment case is that the woman continues to know that 
she has been harassed, despite the high stakes, and second that there is something politically attractive 
in being able to say this. Of course there is a substantial metaepistemological question here about the 
extent to which political considerations such as these ought to play a role in epistemological theoris-
ing. I won’t try to settle that question here, but will simply note that at least on some metaepistemo-
logical views – I’m thinking in particular of the sort of metaepistemological pluralism according to 
which there are various concepts of justification appropriate to different contexts, as well as an amel-
iorative approach according to which we can favour a particular conception of justification on practi-
cal grounds – there might very well be room for such political considerations in one’s epistemological 
theorising. For those who are wary of allowing political judgments to enter into their epistemological 
theorising, I simply invite them to consider their first-order intuitive judgment about the sexual har-
assment case.
9 That is to say, I think that epistemic externalism and Marxian standpoint epistemology are natural 
bedfellows.
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I see the elite position as one of near hopeless epistemological perversity, and the oppressed 
position as the only genuine site of epistemological hope.
Of course, Marxists and Marxist feminists never thought that the epistemic privilege 
of the proletariat or women amounted to automatic access to the truth about political and 
social reality. As both Marx and Hartsock respectively emphasise, the proletariat and femi-
nist standpoints must be achieved. By this they do not mean simply that the proletariat and 
women must overcome false consciousness in order to achieve revolutionary conscious-
ness. Of course they do mean this. But they also mean that the proletariat and women must 
achieve their enlightened standpoint through political revolution. And it’s to the question 
of revolution that I would like to now, finally, turn.
7
In the conclusion of his book, Stanley anticipates a possible misreading: namely, that he 
dismisses or ignores the “importance of social movements in articulating and acting against 
inequalities and injustices of various sorts” (2015, 292). Stanley wants to underscore the 
importance, as he sees it, of “human agency, carefully crafted appeals, consciousness-raising 
of various sorts and at differing levels….cultural and artistic innovations and aesthetic chal-
lenges, years of human labor, blood, death, suffering, dreams, direct collective action” (ibid 
293). And yet Stanley rightly wants to remind us how often political efforts are co-opted 
by and subsumed under the reigning ideology – how the supposed completion of a fight 
for justice often masks ongoing injustice. The constant invocation of Martin Luther King 
amongst defenders of white supremacy is an obvious case in point. In all this I think Stanley 
is right, and I want to be careful not to misrepresent him in just the way he anticipates. But 
still I want to ask: why not revolution? Why the lingering hope that the elites will come 
to their senses, will see the contradictions between democracy and inequality, and change 
their oppressive ways?
As I’ve already suggested, I think part of the answer lies in Stanley’s fundamen-
tal optimism about elites, for all his serious criticism and evident contempt. This 
is what motivates, I earlier suggested, his desire to formulate an internal critique 
of American society – a critique that will reveal to elites the tension between their 
democratic aspirations and their embrace of inequality. But perhaps there is also 
Stanley’s optimism about philosophy at work here. It would be really nice for philos-
ophers —at least those of us who care about injustice and oppression— if what was 
needed was better and more careful argumentation in order to rationally persuade 
ourselves out of bad ideology: if we as analytic philosophers had just the right ham-
mer for the nail.
I’m not saying that philosophy has little or no effect on political reality. It’s a very diffi-
cult thing to say, after all, just how political change happens, and without knowing that, it’s 
hard to know what role philosophy might and should play in that change. But I fear that 
the thought that what we need, politically speaking, is analytic philosophy —and in partic-
ular the tools of analytic epistemology and philosophy of language— is one more legitima-
tion myth of which we should be suspicious. After all, it would be convenient for us as pro-
fessional philosophers not only if our somewhat peculiar skills turned out to be essential for 
the pursuit of justice, but also if it turned out that the use of those skills could render politi-
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cal revolution, especially violent revolution, unnecessary. For, if the revolution did come, 
surely many of us would have much to lose.
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